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Abstract—With a rapid growth of the Internet, exploring
cost-effective and time-efficient methods for creating Internet
services has become critical. As an emerging technology, service
aggregation has been regarded as a promising candidate.
However, it also raises serious issues on privacy management,
as a service is usually provided by multiple providers that
are usually transparent to its users. We observe that these
issues have not been formally studied in the literature. In this
paper, we propose a formal model for the privacy management
in service aggregation and present a negotiation strategy on
different privacy policies between two organizations.
Keywords-privacy policy; service aggregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and
web service technologies is making the boundaries between
network domains fade out. It is a trend for a business entity
to combine the various services offered by various service
providers in different domains along with some of its own
services and resell the aggregated services to users. Service
aggregation becomes a cost-effective and time-efficient way
to develop new applications and services [5], [7]. Its benefit
originates from the added value generated by the possible
interactions and by the large scale rather than by the capabil-
ities of its individual service provider separately. Clearly, this
paradigm creates tremendous opportunities in e-businesses.
However, its nature of cross-organisation raises serious chal-
lenges for privacy management. Because aggregating services
implies the sharing of information between services, privacy
protection must be considered. Businesses are often prohibited
by law or by contract from disclosing the personal/private
information of users/partners to third parties. To protect users’
privacy, organizations require privacy policies. When a user
accesses proprietary services provided by a single service
provider, user’s privacy is protected by the privacy policy
of the provider. However, when a user’s information needs
to be shared by multiple service providers, which might
have some inconsistent or even conflicting privacy policies,
privacy protection obviously becomes a more challenging
problem. Therefore, advanced privacy management should be
investigated. This includes the autonomous comparison of
privacy policies, detection of inconsistency/conflicts, analysis
of risks associated with the detected inconsistency/conflicts,
and resolution of inconsistency/conflicts.
There are several useful tools for privacy policy manage-
ment, such as XACML [10], P3P [12], APPEL [3], EPAL
[4] and ASL [6]. These tools provide formal approaches
for describing privacy policies. With novel functionalities,
several privacy policy comparison and negotiation protocols
are introduced [11], [2], [1], [14], [9], [8], [13]. However,
these methods do not address the privacy management for
service aggregation. In particular, they do not consider large
privacy policy sets from multiple parties. In this paper, we
address these issues by proposing a formal method for privacy
policy management in service aggregation and a privacy policy
negotiation method.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section II the high-level architecture of service aggregation
with privacy policies is demonstrated. Section III shows the
basic components. The syntax and semantics are introduced in
Section IV and V, respectively. Section VI gives several pri-
vacy policy matching protocols. Finally, Section VII concludes
with future work.
II. SERVICE AGGREGATION WITH PRIVACY POLICIES
Service aggregation is defined as logically combining the
functionalities of multiple services as parts of a single, de-
scriptive and meaningful information abstraction. In short, it
is the combination of a set of services to achieve a common
goal. Service aggregation allows users, service providers and
a service aggregator to collaborate in highly distributed envi-
ronments, and establish on-demand, short-term and dynamic
business relationships for maximizing profitability. Each par-
ticipant in service aggregation has its own privacy policy. A
general diagram that illustrates the high-level architecture of
service aggregation with privacy policies is shown in Figure
1.
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Fig. 1. High-level Architecture of Service Aggregation with Privacy Policies
As depicted in Figure 1, there are three types of parties
in service aggregation: user, service providers and service
aggregator. The service providers provide various public and
professional services ranging from simple information retrieval
services to more complex transaction oriented services, and the
service aggregator works as an agency for service providers
to aggregate various services offered by service providers
along with some of its own services to serve users. Service
aggregator and service providers have their associated privacy
policies, and users have their own privacy policies (also called
privacy preferences), too.
Privacy policy, as a special case of the authorization for
controlling access to personal information, specifies under
what conditions the personal information can be exchanged
and what the information is used for. The privacy policies of
service aggregator and service providers state what personal
information it requires from a user and how the information
will be used. The privacy policy of a user states what private
information she is willing to share, with whom and under what
circumstances it may be shared.
A privacy policy is attached to a software agent that acts
for a user, a service aggregator or a service provider. Prior
to the activation of a particular service, the agent for the
user and the agent for the service aggregator will undergo
a privacy policy exchange, in which the policies are examined
for compatibility. The service is only activated if the policies
are consistent. Similarly, when the service aggregator would
integrate a service from a service provider who needs some
personal information, the agent for the service aggregator and
the agent for the service provider will also examinate their
privacy policies for compatibility. The services are aggregated
only if the policies are not conflictive.
III. BASIC COMPONENTS
Throughout the paper, we denote the set of natural numbers
by N and the set of numbers {1, 2, · · · , n} by [n].
Our model relies on the following three basic components.
The first component is a set S = U ∪ SA ∪ SP of subjects
that can operate an object actively. Subjects can be users (i.e.,
elements of U), or the service aggregator (the only element
of SA), or service providers (i.e., elements of SP).
The second basic component is a set O = D ∪ P ∪ M of
objects, which are the passive resources to be operated by
subjects. Objects in our model include data (i.e., elements of
D) of users, service aggregator and service providers, their
privacy policies (i.e., elements of P), and messages (i.e.,
elements of M) that is associated with two subjects (a user
and the service aggregator, or the service aggregator and a
service provider).
The last basic component is a set OP of operators,
denoting the operations that subjects can execute on the objects
in the system. Operators to be considered depend on the
underlying activities in the system, usually include read, write,
add, delete, create, revoke, send, receive, etc.
The basic components of our model are formalized by the
notion of Service Aggregation as follows.
Definition III.1 (Service Aggregation) A Service Aggrega-
tion consists of the following components:
1) Subjects. A countable set S of labels, called
subject identifiers. This set is partitioned into three
subsets, namely, U (users), SA (service aggregator)
and SP (service providers), where there is only one
element in SA. The service aggregator interacts with
users and service providers, but users do not interact
with service providers.
2) Objects. A countable set O of labels, called
object identifiers. This set is partitioned into three
subsets, namely, D (data), P (privacy policies) and M
(messages).
3) Operators. A countable set OP of labels, called
operator identifiers.
IV. SYNTAX OF SERVICE AGGREGATION
We assume that a service aggregation W has been fixed.
Over W , a set of rules and vocabularies can be specified. In
addition, we assume that the following sets are given:
1) A finite set C of data categories with a fixed vocabulary,
which are structured in hierarchies as follows. C contains
the special category sc, called super category. On sc
the partial order relation  is defined such that sc  c,
for all c ∈ C. Given two categories ci and cj , if ci  cj
we say that cj is a subcategory of ci.
2) A finite set V of context variables with a fixed domain.
3) A finite set D of context data values with a fixed
semantics.
Definition IV.1 (Personal Information) Personal informa-
tion is a set PI of data about an individual.
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Personal information can be partitioned into a set of data
categories, such as contact information, financial information,
medical data, demographic data, internet protocol information,
cookie information, purchasing data, and others. Figure 2 gives
an example of the hierarchy of Personal Information [6].
Fig. 2. Hierarchy of Personal Information
Definition IV.2 (User Data) User data includes some of per-
sonal information about a customer and some information that
the system creates in the process of replying the customer’s
service request.
Usually user data about a customer contains not only the
customer’s personal information but also the services the
customer requested and the corresponding service providers.
Definition IV.3 (Message) A message is a piece of informa-
tion one subject sends to another subject.
Definition IV.4 (Constraint) A component is a pair com =
(dv, val) of a variable dv and a set val, where dv ∈ V and
val ⊆ D ∧ val = ∅. val is a set of values assigned to the
variable dv. Given two components comi = (dvi, vali) and
comj = (dvj , valj), comi ⊆ comj iff dvi = dvj∨vali ⊆ valj .
A constraint is a finite set cstri =
(comi1 , comi2 , · · · , comin) (n ∈ N) of compo-
nents comij (j ∈ [n]). Given two constraints
cstri = (comi1 , comi2 , · · · , comin) (n ∈ N) and
cstrj = (comj1 , comj2 , · · · , comjm) (m ∈ N), if ∀comik
(k ∈ [n]), ∃comjl (l ∈ [m]), such that comik ⊆ comjl , we say
cstrj is a subconstraint of cstri, or cstri is a supconstraint
of cstrj , denoted by cstri  cstrj .
Definition IV.5 (Term) A term is a reference t to a data
category on specific pieces of personal information, where
t ∈ C.
Definition IV.6 (Privacy Policy Vocabulary) A privacy
policy vocabulary is a pair PPVOC = (T , CST R) where
T and CST R are a finite set of terms and a finite set of
constraints, respectively.
Definition IV.7 (Privacy Policy) For a privacy policy vo-
cabulary PPVOC, a privacy policy is a tuple Pol =
{(T1, CSTR1), (T2, CSTR2), · · · , (Tn, CSTRn)} (n ∈ N)
of pairs (Ti, CSTRi) (i ∈ [n]) where Ti ∈ T and CSTRi ∈
CST R, which defines what kinds of personal information
{Ti}i=1,··· ,n are exchanged between two subjects and how
the personal information are used and stored under the
corresponding constraints {CSTRi}i=1,··· ,n.
For privacy policies, usually there are following context
variables: Recipient, Data, Purpose, Retention, Disclose-to,
Consent, Obligation, Condition, Remedy, and Action. The
first four variables are compulsory in a privacy policy, and
others are optional. For the optional variables, different privacy
policy languages define different parties of them. Notice that,
as stated in [10], “Purpose" is the only variable that must
exist in a privacy policy but not occur in a tranditional access
control policy. The notion of purpose plays a major role
in protecting privacy, since privacy policies are concerned
with the purposes that personal information is cllected for
rather than the actions that recipients perform on the personal
information, and traditional access control policies cannot
easily achieve privacy protection.
For a context variable, there are a lot of context values,
which are defferent in different privacy policy language. For
example, the values to the variable “Recipient" in P3P are
“ours", “delivery", “same", “other-recipient", “unrelated", and
“public".
Example IV.1 Consider the privacy policy set by a subject s
as follows.






























It states that, the privacy policy protects two categories of
personal information, T s1 and T
s
2 . The constraint CSTR
s
1 is
for T s1 and the constraint CSTR
s
1 is for T
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values, vals1−1 and val
s
1−2, respectively, and for the con-
straint CSTRs2, there are one variable, dv
s
2−1, with the value,
vals2−1. Now we assign “Home-Telephone-Number", “Pur-
pose", “Recipient", “contact", “ours & delivery", “Credit-Card-














the detailed privacy policy is as follows.
Pols = ((Home − Telephone − Number,
(Purpose, contact),
(Recipient, ours & delivery)),
(Credit − Card − Information,
(Retention, no − retention)))
This means, in order to contact the user, s collects a user’s
home telephone number. However, not only s knows the
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telephone number, she will give the telephone number to the
third party for delivery. s also requires the information of the
user’s credit card, but she will not keep the information any
more after it is used for current business matter.
Definition IV.8 (Service Aggregation Vocabulary) A
service aggregation vocabulary is a triple SAVOC = (S,
O, OP) where S is a set of subjects including users, service
aggregator and service providers, O is a set of objects
including personal information, privacy policies, user data
and messages, and OP is a set of operators.
V. SEMANTICS OF SERVICE AGGREGATION
We point out that semantic aspects play a crucial role in our
proposal, since they make the model innovative with respect
to existing approaches. This matter will be deeply analyzed in
this section. In this section, we provide the formal semantics
of service aggregation.
Definition V.1 (Request) A request is a message that a sub-
ject sends to another subject to ask for some resource. For a
privacy policy vocabulary PPVOC, a personal information
(PI) request is a request taking the form of a finite set
req = ((t1, cstr1), · · · , (tm, cstrm)) (m ∈ N) of pairs of term
ti and constraint ctsri (i ∈ [m]) to ask for some personal
information.
Definition V.2 (Matching Rule) Given a PI request req =
((t1, cstr1), · · · , (tm, cstrm)) (m ∈ N) and a privacy policy
Pol = {(T1, CSTR1), · · · , (Tn, CSTRn)} (n ∈ N), the
request matches the privacy policy, denoted by req  Pol, iff
∀(ti, cstri) ∈ req (i ∈ [m]), ∃(Tj , CSTRj) ∈ Pol (j ∈ [n]),
such that Tj  ti ∧ CSTRj  cstri.
If a request matches a constraint, then it matches all
supconstraints of the constraint. i.e., the match rules with
positive results are additionally inherited up the hierarchies.
If a request does not match the constraint (in all hierarchies),
then it does not match all subconstraints of the constraint. i.e.,
the match rules with negative results are inherited down the
hierarchies.
The set of privacy policies P is partially ordered by . The
partial order is defined by a cover relationship. It models a
part − of relation among privacy policies.
Definition V.3 (Cover) The cover relationship 
is defined as follows: a privacy policy Poly =
{(T y1 , CSTRy1), · · · , (T yn , CSTRyn)} covers another privacy
policy Polx = {(T x1 , CSTRx1), · · · , (T xm, CSTRxm)}
(n, m ∈ N), denoted with Poly  Polx, iff ∀(T xi , CSTRxi )
(i ∈ [m]), ∃(T yj , CSTR
y
j ) (j ∈ [n]), such that
T yj  T xi ∧ CSTR
y
j  CSTRxi .
Definition V.4 (Incomparable) Given two privacy policies
Polx and Poly , if neither Polx  Poly nor Poly  Polx
holds, the two privay policies are said to be incomparable.
Definition V.5 (Formula) For a service aggregation vocabu-
lary SAVOC, a formula is a construction of form: op(s1, o) ::
s2, where s1, s2 ∈ S, o ∈ O, and op ∈ OP , which states that
the subject s1 executes the operator op on object o and outputs
the result to the subject s2. If two subjects are the same one,
the formula is denoted with op(s1, o). If there are more than
one subject executing a operator on more than one object, all
the subjects should be included in a pair of parentheses (),
and so do all objects.
Example V.1 A user u creates her personal information pi,
the formula is create(c, pi).
Example V.2 The service aggregator sa uses its own infor-
mation infsa to replace a user’s personal information pi, the
formula is replace(sa, (pi, infsa).
Example V.3 The service aggregator sa and a service
provider sp negotiate on the personal information request req
and the result of negotiation is send to the service provider
sp, the formula is negotiate((sa, sp), req) :: sp.
Definition V.6 (Conditional Formula) A conditional for-
mula is a formula with a condition. It takes the form:
op(s1, o) :: s2 ← con(X), which states that subject s1
executes the operation op on object o and outputs the result
to the subject s2 when the condition con(X) is true, where
the X can be a formula or matching rule. A condition is
either a positive condition con(X) or a negative condition
¬con(X). Two conditions are complementary if they are of
the form con(X) and ¬con(X).
Example V.4 Let’s consider the following conditional for-
mula,
send(u, pi) :: sa ← con(reqsa  Polu).
It states that, a user u sends her personal information pi
to the service aggregator sa if the request of the service
aggregator reqsa matches the privacy policy of the user Polu.
VI. MATCHING PRIVACY POLICY
To make their services available to users, service providers
have to register the services in the service aggregator. Different
service may collect different personal information of users. For
every service that would be registered, the service provider
sends a PI request to the service aggregator. The service
aggregator checks if the request matches its privacy policy.
If the request does not match the privacy policy, the service
aggregator will negotiate with the Service Provider on the
unmatched part in the request. The strategy of negotiation is
as follows.
Case 1: Service Aggregator sa does not collect the data
dataunmatch in the unmatched part ump.
Rule 1.1 Service Aggregator sa asks Service
Provider sp to remove the unmatched
part ump from the request reqsp.
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Rule 1.2 sa may collect the data dataunmatch
by negotiating with the user who
needs the service.
Rule 1.3 sa may replace the data dataunmatch
with its own information infsa to
reply sp.
Case 2: The constraints cstrspunmatch on the data
dataunmatch in the request req
sp are conflictive
to the constraints in the privacy policy of Service
Aggregator sa.
Rule 2.1 Service Aggregator sa asks Service
Provider sp to change the constraints
cstrspunmatch to make the request
reqsp match the privacy policy of sa.
Rule 2.2 sa may replace the data dataunmatch
with its own information infsa to
reply.
We model the above rules as the following algorithm.
Algorithm: negotiate((sa, sp), ump)
INPUT: sa, sp, ump
OUTPUT: TRUE if the negotiation is fail, FALSE otherwise.
METHOD:
1: if ¬con(collect(sa, dataunmatch)) then
2: if remove(sp, ump) then
3: return TRUE
4: else if collect(sa, dataunmatch) then
5: return TRUE
6: else if replace(sa, (dataunmatch, infsa) then
7: return TRUE





13: if change(sp, cstrspunmatch) then
14: return TRUE
15: else if replace(sa, (dataunmatch, infsa) then
16: return TRUE




Now we give the detailed procedure of matching privacy
policies as follows.
Step 1 Service Provider sp sends a PI request reqsp to
Service Aggregator sa, who will check whether
the request reqsp matches its privacy policy
Polsa or not.
Step 2 If reqsp does not match Polsa, sa negotiates with
sp on the unmatched part ump.
step 3 If the result of negotiation is false, then sa rejects
sp to register the service.
Step 4 If reqsp matches Polsa or the result of negotia-
tion is true, sa accepts sp as a legitimate service
provider for the service.
It is modeled as follows.
Matching Protocol
1: send(sp, reqsp) :: sa
2: negotiate((sa, sp), ump) ← ¬con(reqsp  Polsa)
3: reject ← ¬con(negotiate((sa, sp), ump))
4: accept ← con(negotiation((sa, sp), ump)) ∪ con(reqsa 
Polsa)
When a service provider updates its privacy policy, if the
old privacy policy can cover the new one, it is fine with the
system. Otherwise, the service provider has to check if the
change of privacy policy affects the original PI request for the
registered service. If not, it is ok for the system. Otherwise,
the matching protocol is excuted. If the output of the protocol
is “reject", the registered service should be removed from the
available service list of the service aggregator. Otherwise, it
is retained.
When service aggregator updates its privacy policy, it also
checks if the new privacy policy can cover the old one. If
yes, no more action needs to be taken. Otherwise, the service
aggregator will run the matching protocol for every registered
service. The service aggregator will hold the service with the
output “accept" of the protocol or remove the service from its
available service list with the output “reject".
We omit the modelling of above two scenarios here.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEM
In this paper, we proposed a logic model that naturally
supports the encoding of complex privacy policy specifications
in service aggregation. The syntax and semantics are both
simple and intuitive. Based on them, we showed how to
negotiate and match two privacy policies.
This paper represents our first attempt at a formal study of
privacy policies in service aggregation. We plan to extend our
semantics-centered approach to areas including privacy policy
enforcement and privacy practice auditing.
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